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THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN THE
PREVENTION OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES
IN STATE PRISONS
I. Introduction
The goal of preventing the spread of communicable diseases' in
prisons2 is widely accepted. 3 Yet the United States apparently has
failed to achieve that goal, because the rate at which communicable
diseases are contracted in prisons remains high.
4
Control over the spread of communicable diseases is particularly
important in prisons. The high incidence of disease among inmates
entering prisons5 is amplified by the special circumstances of the
prison setting that promote the spread of communicable diseases6 and
1. See AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASS'N, CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES
IN MAN 288 (A. Benenson ed. 1970)(communicable disease defined as illness that
arises through transmission of specific infectious agent to susceptible host).
2. For the purposes of this Note, "prison" is defined as any federal, state or local
facility used to incarcerate convicted criminals.
3. See Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners Rule 24 (United
Nations 1955) in MEDICAL CARE OF PRISONERS AND DETAINEES app. 1 at 202 (Ciba
Foundation Symposium 1973) (minimum rule mandating examination of every pris-
oner, with particular emphasis on discovering and segregating prisoners with com-
municable disease) [hereinafter cited as United Nations Standards]. France, for
example, has implemented a policy of disease prevention in its prisons. Fully, Peni-
tentiary Medicine in France in MEDICAL CARE OF PRISONERS AND DETAINEES 80 (Ciba
Foundation Symposium 1973)("[p]reventive medicine is exercised in the form of
systematic screening for tuberculosis, venereal diseases and mental diseases ...").
4. See D. JONES, THE HEALTH RISKS OF IMPRISONMENT 36 (1976) (prisoners
under 45 years of age had reported sickness rate 3.2 times higher than non-institu-
tionalized males of same age group); Walker & Gordon, Health and High Density
Confinement in jails and Prisons FED. PROBATION, March 1980, at 53, 56 (American
Medical Association (AMA) found an extremely high incidence of communicable
diseases among inmates in United States correctional institutions).
5. Amicus Brief of the Am. Med. Ass'n and the Am. Pub. Health Ass'n at 17,
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Brief].
6. See Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 13 ("[t]he broad consensus of medical
judgment is opposed to prolonged close confinement because of the 'danger of [the]
spread of acute infectious diseases' ") (citation omitted); L. NovIcK & M. AL-IBRAHIM,
HEALTH PROBLEMS IN THE PRISON SETTING: A CLINICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE AP-
PROACH 5 (1977) (prisoners are special "at-risk" population with respect to certain
health problems) [hereinafter cited as HEALTH PROBLEMS]. See generally Sobal &
Loveland, Infectious Disease in a Total Institution: A Study of the Influenza Epi-
demic of 1978 on a College Campus, 97 PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS 66, 67 (1982) (social
structure of "total" institutions, i.e., those characterized by standardized mass activ-
ity under central authority, provides greater opportunity for spread of infectious
disease).
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foster diseases like Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)7
and tuberculosis." The extent of the spread of disease, coupled with
inmates' dependency on prison authorities for proper medical care,9
mandate close scrutiny of both judicial and legislative responses to the
problem. ' 0
Insufficient state legislation" and unresponsive prison administra-
tors 2 have forced prisoners to seek federal judicial relief.' 3 Federal
Overcrowding in prisons increases the risk of the spread of communicable disease.
See Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 398 (10th Cir. 1977) (for example, flu,
hepatitis, tuberculosis, etc).
7. LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 702, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 306 (Sup.
Ct. Dutchess County 1983). "On consideration of age, sex, and geographical distri-
bution, coupled with the homosexual and IV drug user prison population, it must be,
and indeed is, recognized that a state correctional facility . . . is a potentially high
risk setting for AIDS." Id. But see Maffucci, Responding to AIDS in Prisons: The
Team Approach, 45 CORECTIONS TODAY 68, 82 (Dec. 1983) (inmates who are not
intraveneous drug users and do not engage in homosexual activity have no greater
risk of developing AIDS than general public).
8. Abeles, Feibes, Mandel & Girard, The Large City Prison: A Reservoir of
Tuberculosis, 101 AM. REV. OF RESPIRAToRY DISEASE 706, 708 (1970) ("[t]he popula-
tion of a large city prison is an ideal seed bed for tuberculosis"); Stead, Undetected
Tuberculosis in Prison: Source of Infection for Community at Large, 240 J. A.M.A.
2544 (1978) (documented rate of tuberculosis among inmates in Arkansas prisons was
reported to be 6.5 times greater than in general population).
9. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) ("[a]n inmate must rely on
prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those
needs will not be met"); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977)
(government has affirmative duty to meet inmates' medical needs).
10. Enforcing prisoners' rights to medical care may require wide-ranging reform
of systemic problems, such as reducing prison populations, shutting an entire facility
or even questioning the very institution of imprisonment. See Note, Complex En-forcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions; 94 HARV. L. REV. 626, 635-37 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Complex Enforcement]. With these possibilities in mind, this
Note will be limited to the discussion of less drastic disease preventive measures such
as intake screening, periodic physical examinations, hygiene maintenance and ade-
quate record-keeping. For a discussion of model standards, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 148-71.
11. For a discussion of state statutes, see infra notes 120-25 and accompanying
text.
12. See Union County Jail Inmates v. Dibuono, 718 F.2d 1247, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983) (petition for rehearing en banc denied) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) ("[c]ounty
officials acknowledge that new inmates are not given complete physical examination
at the time of commitment"); French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910, 918 (S.D. Ind.
1982) (despite statute entitling committed prisoner to medical care (IND. CODE ANN.
§ 11-10-3-2(c) (Burns 1981)), prisoners' communicable tuberculosis went undetected
for months).
13. See Hass, The Comparative Study of State and Federal Judicial Behavior
Revisited, 44 J. OF POLITICS 721 (1982) (state supreme courts have been significantly
less inclined than United States Courts of Appeals to support prisoners' efforts to
secure judicial redress of their grievances).
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courts, however, traditionally have been reluctant to become entan-
gled with state prison administration due to the barriers established by
federalism and separation of powers. 14 This Note attempts to balance
the federal courts' need to insure that state prisoners are adequately
protected from communicable diseases against the argument that fed-
eral judicial interference in state prison administration endangers le-
gitimate state interests of federalism and separation of powers. 15
II. Federalism
The federal government's excessive entanglement with the adminis-
tration of state affairs traditionally has been proscribed by the doc-
trine of federalism."' The contemporary federal/state conflict is posed
most sharply in lawsuits brought against state and local officials in
federal courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. i1 This conflict inevitably
surfaces in prison condition cases' 8 because complaints about inade-
14. See L. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 111-12
(1975) (hands-off doctrine is based on fundamental principles of separation of
powers, federalism and judicial self-restraint) [hereinafter cited as BERKSON]; Com-
ment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for Courts in
Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367, 371 (1977) ("[t]he need to remedy
constitutional violations stands against the notion that judicial interference in prison
administration endangers legitimate concerns of federalism, the separation of
powers, and deference to the expertise of state administrators") (footnotes omitted)
[hereinafter cited as Prison Reform].
15. This Note challenges the notion that a study of prison reform requires appli-
cation of very narrow legal principles that are restricted to the confines of prisons,
since a solution to the problem of communicable disease transcends prison walls and
requires an examination of fundamental concepts of American democracy. See P.
CLUTE, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF PRISONS AND JAILS 5 (1980).
16. See THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 256 (J. Madison) (Colonial Press 1901). "The
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite." Id.
17. See Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1133 (1977); Comment, Protecting Fundamental Rights in State Courts:
Fitting a State Peg to a Federal Hole, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 72-80 (1977).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
18. For a discussion of prison condition cases under the eighth amendment see
infra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.
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quate state prison conditions typically are brought in federal district
courts. 19 Three different stages of judicial responses to this problem
have emerged.2 0
A. The Hands-off Policy
In the past, federal courts took a "hands-off" approach to com-
plaints about state correctional practices. 21 This policy had the advan-
tage of leaving the decision-making to those most knowledgeable
about the needs of the local correctional system while avoiding federal
intervention in state affairs.2 2 However, the "hands-off" approach had
the disadvantage of leaving important constitutional issues at the
administrative rather than the judicial level, where "administrative
decisions were largely invisible, reasons for decisions were seldom
given, and formal policies were largely nonexistent. ' 23 The demise of
the "hands-off' doctrine has been well chronicled, 24 reducing it to
19. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIREc-
TOR 102-03 (1982) (state prisoners filed 16,741 civil rights complaints in federal courts
in 1982); see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING
PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 8 (1980) ("[p]risoner rights
cases occupy a significant percentage of the time of federal courts, especially of the
United States district judges") [hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL REPORT].
20. See JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 29-32; Lay, The 'Why' of Federal
Judicial Intervention in State Correctional Institutions, 41 CORRECTIONS TODAY 36,
37 (May-June 1979) [hereinafter cited as Why Intervention].
21. Cases recognizing the "hands-off" doctrine include Banning v. Looney, 213
F.2d 771, 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954); Garcia v. Steele, 193
F.2d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1951); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951). See also Comment, Federal Intervention in State
Prisons: The Modern Prison-Conditions Case, 19 Hous. L. REV. 931, 932-33 (1982)
(federal courts consistently declined to exercise jurisdiction over the actual conditions
and practices within state prisons) [hereinafter cited as Federal Intervention]. It is
important to note that the hands-off doctrine is not a rule of law but merely a
description of judicial behavior. BERKSON, supra note 14, at 111.
22. See Prieser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973) (disputes in state prisons
over "eating, sleeping, dressing, washing, working and playing ... are so peculiarly
within state authority and expertise the states have an important interest in not being
bypassed in the correction of those problems"); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178,
205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). The tools for prison reform "do
not lie with a remote federal court. The sensitivity to local nuance, opportunity for
daily perserverance, and the human and monetary resources required lie rather with
legislators, executives, and citizens in their communities." Id. Why Intervention,
supra note 20, at 37 (intervention in prison affairs usurps powers reserved to states).
23. Remington, State Prisoner Litigation and the Federal Courts, ARIZONA ST.
L.J. 549, 549 (1974) (outlining fundamental questions concerning prisoner cases that
plague federal judiciary).
24. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979); Comment, Eighth
Amendment-A Significant Limit on Federal Court Activism in Ameliorating State
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historical significance, but the doctrine continues to provide insight
into the federal judiciary's attitude toward state prisons.
B. The Open Door Policy
During the 1960's and 1970's, access to the federal judiciary, fore-
closed during the hands-off era, was opened wide to inmate com-
plaints about state prison conditions. 25 This access was immediate
26
and burgeoning. 27 The epitome of the open door era were decisions
which examined prisons in great detail and fashioned remedies touch-
ing nearly every aspect of prison life. 28 This judicial activism gave way
to a period of re-evaluation.2 9
Prison Conditions, 72 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1345, 1346-47 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Federal Activism]; Federal Intervention, supra note 21, at 932, 934;
Comment, Diamond in the Rough: Local Liability for Unconstitutional Conditions
in County Jails-An Analysis of Jones v. Diamond, 51 Miss. L.J. 31, 38 (1980).
For the seminal work on the demise of the hands-off doctrine, see Comment,
Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Com-
plaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
25. See JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 30 (recognizing "open-door" era);
Why Intervention, supra note 20, at 37 ("during the 1960s and 1970s literally
thousands of Section 1983 actions were filed by state prisoners").
26. Prior to the passage of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act in
1980, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a-j (Supp. V 1981), an inmate alleging a Section
1983 action was not required to exhaust either his state judicial or administrative
remedies. Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S.
249, 251 (1971) (per curiam); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.4 (1968); Houghton
v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiam); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 417
(1967) (per curiam); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963);
Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), rev'd in part, Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1977).
State prison condition cases brought under the Federal Habeas Corpus Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1976), require a prior exhaustion of state remedies. 28 U.S.C. §
2254b (1976) (writ of habeas corpus will not be granted unless applicant exhausts
available remedies in state courts). Although habeas corpus remains a permissible
means of bringing conditions-of-confinement cases, see JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note
19, at 1 n.8 (some state conditions-of-confinement cases are brought under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254), the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure has advised against
it. H.R. Doc. 94-464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1976) (recommending that conditions
cases be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
27. In 1966, the first year that civil rights cases filed by prisoners were catego-
rized separately, state prisoners filed 218 civil rights complaints. By 1976, the num-
ber had increased by nearly 3,100% to 6,958 cases. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 189 (1976).
28. See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the totality
approach under the eighth amendment.
29. See JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 31 (recognizing period of re-evalua-
tion).
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C. Re-evaluation
Recently, both Congress3 ° and the federal judiciary3' have at-
tempted to re-evaluate the role of federal courts in state prison affairs.
1. Congress
In 1980, Congress passed the Institutionalized Persons Act (the
Act).32 The Act has two primary purposes. First, it gives the United
States Attorney General standing33 to bring federal suits on behalf of
residents of state institutions to protect their constitutional and federal
statutory rights. 34 Secondly, the Act mandates that federal courts
grant continuances 35 to section 1983 actions brought by adult pris-
oners who have not exhausted "plain, speedy, and effective adminis-
trative remedies as are available."36 This exhaustion requirement is a
narrow exception to the general rule that exhaustion of state remedies
is not a prerequisite to section 1983 action. 37
30. See Henak, Prisoners'Rights, ANN. SURV. OF AM. L., 291, 310 (1981) [herein-
after cited as Annual Survey]. Passage of the Institutionalized Person's Act of 1980,
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a-j, "represents congressional acquiescence in, if not
encouragement of, . . . judicial activism, at least in the area of state institutions." Id.
31. Id. In contrast to the open door policy, "[rJecent United States Supreme
Court decisions have emphasized judicial deference to the decisions of prison admin-
istrators in the management of prisons." Id. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying
text for a discussion of those decisions.
32. Pub. L. 96-247, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a-j (Supp. V 1981). For
legislative history and purpose see S. REP. No. 416, 96th Cong., 1st Sess (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Report], reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
787; Annual Survey, supra note 30, at 304-311.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (Supp. V 1981). This portion of the Act was passed in
response to two decisions holding that the United States Attorney General lacked
standing to initiate civil challenges to conditions in state institutions. See Senate
Report, supra note 32, at 2-3; 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 789-90 (citing
United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979)).
34. The word "institution" is defined at 42 U.S.C. § 1997(1) (Supp. V 1981).
Generally, the Act is intended to cover "any facility where persons residing therein
are dependent for their basic living needs on the services provided by the facility."
See Senate Report, supra note 32, at 36; 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 818.
Privately owned and operated facilities whose sole nexus with the state is licensing or
payment or approval of a state plan under the Social Security Act are not institutions
under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(2) Supp. V 1981.
35. A maximum ninety day continuance is allowed under the Act. 42 U.S.C. §
19 97e(a)(1)(Supp. V 1981). Dismissal is not permitted. Kennedy v. Herschler, 655
F.2d 210, 212 (10th Cir. 1981) ("there is no congressional intent to authorize dis-
missal of a [ 1983 action" under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1))(emphasis in original).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
37. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 508 (1982). For authority support-
ing the general rule, see cases cited in supra note 26. This portion of the Act was
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The Act's effectiveness and appropriateness in correcting inade-
quate disease prevention measures is unclear. The Attorney General
can bring an action on behalf of prisoners in a state institution 31 only if
he has reasonable cause 39 to believe that there is an egregious and
flagrant violation of the prisoners' constitutional rights. 40 Violation of
prisoners' federal statutory rights, however, does not warrant action
by the Attorney General. 41 Combined with the relative disuse of this
section of the Act in prison cases, 42 the requirement of an "egregious or
flagrant" constitutional violation 43 makes it doubtful that the Attor-
ney General will use the Act to correct a subtle but harmful condition
such as the lack of adequate disease prevention measures.
44
In addition, application of the Act's exhaustion requirement is con-
tingent upon state maintenance of administrative remedies which
meet the standards proposed by the Attorney General. 45 A state's
administrative remedy can be approved by its district court or certi-
fied by the Attorney General. 46 However, only Virginia's administra-
tive remedy has been certified, 47 and district courts have been reluc-
passed in response to the burgeoning number of prisoner cases that found their way
into the federal court system during the 1960s and 1970s. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 509.
38. The term "institution" includes any state "jail, prison or other correctional
facility." 42 U.S.C. § 1997(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1981).
39. Senate Report, supra note 32, at 29; 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 811
(Attorney General must thoroughly investigate conditions at institution prior to
initiating litigation). State officials must be notified at least seven days prior to
commencement of the investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a) (Supp. V 1981).
41. Id. The Act expressly provides that the Attorney General only has standing to
sue on behalf of prison inmates for violation of rights "secured or protected by the
Constitution of the United States." Id.
42. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1984 at 1, col. 1 ("[f]ederal officials said the suit was
the first against a local jail under the 1980 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act"). But see United States v. Elrod, 627 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1980) (relying on Act,
court of appeals reinstated an action brought by Attorney General on behalf of
inmates in Illinois prison which previously was dismissed for lack of standing).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a) (Supp. V 1981).
44. For a discussion of the constitutionality of disease prevention measures in
prisons see infra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(2). "The exhaustion of administrative remedies ...
may not be required unless ... such administrative remedies are in substantial
compliance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated [by the Attorney
General] .... Id. These standards are codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 40.1-22 (1983).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(2).
47. Phelps v. Anderson & Langford, 700 F.2d 147, 149 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983);
Johnson v. Baskerville, 568 F. Supp. 853, 856 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1983); Miller, Inmate
Grievance Procedures Certified, 45 CornEcTIoNs TODAY 76 (Dec. 1983). "On Decem-
ber 14, 1982, Attorney General William French Smith notified former Virginia
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tant to review administrative procedures in the absence of the
Attorney General's certification. 4 Thus, the exhaustion requirement
has been ineffective in encouraging the states to adopt acceptable
administrative remedies.
Even if a state maintains adequate administrative procedures, the
physical harm that may result from any delay may make it inappro-
priate for courts to grant continuances in cases alleging inadequate
disease prevention measures. 49 The exhaustion requirement is not ab-
solute and should be applied only when "appropriate and in the
interests of justice. '" 51
2. Judiciary
The Supreme Court recently has criticized federal judicial interven-
tion in prison administration. 51 In Bell v. Wolfish 52 and Rhodes v.
Chapman53 the Court criticized lower federal court judges for allow-
ing themselves to become involved in the affairs of state prisons.
In Wolfish the Court found that:
many of these ...courts have, in the name of the Constitution,
become increasingly enmeshed in the minutae of prison operations.
Judges ... have a natural tendency to believe that their individual
solutions to often intractable problems are better and more work-
able than those of the persons who are actually charged with and
trained in the running of a particular institution . . . .5
A similar admonition was repeated in Rhodes. 55
A severe restriction on federal court intervention in state affairs was
enunciated in the recent decision of Penhurst State School and Hospi-
Corrections Director R.K. Procunier that Virginia had become the first state in the
union to receive this certification." Id.
48. Remand is often required to determine whether state administrative remedies
comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b). See Johnson v. King, 696 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir.
1983); Goff v. Menke, 672 F.2d 702, 706 (8th Cir. 1982).
49. See Senate Report, supra note 32, at 34. The committee finds the exhaustion
requirement inappropriate when section 1983 actions raise issues which cannot, in
reasonable probability, be resolved by the grievance resolution system, including
cases where imminent danger to life is alleged. Id.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1).
51. See Annual Survey, supra note 30, at 310 ("[r]ecent United States Supreme
Court decisions have emphasized judicial deference to decisions of prison administra-
tors in the management of prisons").
52. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
53. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
54. 441 U.S. at 562.
55. 452 U.S. at 352. "[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison
officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
[Vol. XII
1984] PRISON DISEASE PREVENTION
tal v. Halderman.56 In Penhurst, mentally retarded citizens claimed57
that state officials violated Pennsylvania's Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act of 1966.58 The Court held that the eleventh amend-
ment59 prohibits federal courts from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law even where the claim arises from the federal
court's pendent jurisdiction.6 °
This decision will have a particularly chilling effect on federal cases
alleging inadequate disease prevention measures. In light of Penhurst,
federal courts will be proscribed from adjudicating inmates' claims of
inadequate disease prevention measures because the claims are against
state officials6' and often arise from pendent claims alleging violations
of state statutes. 2 The Penhurst interpretation of the eleventh amend-
ment, however, does not bar federal courts from enjoining state offi-
cials pursuant to the United States Constitution.6 1
In prison condition cases in particular, 4 the Supreme Court has
stated that "a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the
criminal justice system .... Id. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion warned that
this language might be a "signal to prison administrators that the federal courts now
are to adopt a policy of general deference to such administrators and to state
legislatures ..... Id. at 369 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
56. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). The extensive history of this litigation is set forth in
Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman 451 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1981).
57. Id. at 903-04.
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969).
59. The eleventh amendment states in full: "'The judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States bv Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
60. 104 S. Ct. at 919.
61. See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981) (Connecticut
Commissioner of Corrections); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H.
1977) (New Hampshire State Prison Warden).
Penhurst adopted a general rule that " 'a suit is against the sovereign if thejudgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere
with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment would be to restrain
the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.' " 104 S. Ct. at 908 n. 11 (quoting
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963)).
62. See French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910, 927 (S.D. Ind. 1982): Nicholson v.
Choctaw County, 498 F. Supp. 295, 307 (S.D. Ala. 1980); Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris
County, 406 F. Supp. 649, 668 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (consent decree).
63. 104 S. Ct. at 909. This exception is based on Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), where the Court held that the unconstitutional act of a state official is void
and does not "impart to [the official] any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States." Id. at 160.
64. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"[F]ederal courts must continue to be available to those state inmates who sincerely
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a
federal or state institution.-6 5 Federal court intervention in the pre-
vention of communicable disease therefore hinges on whether lack of




Prisoners once were believed to be "slaves of the state"66 and devoid
of all legal rights. Now, a more humanistic approach has been taken
by the Supreme Court, which has stated that "[t]here is no iron
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this coun-
try. 6 7 Prisoners' constitutional rights are balanced against legitimate
state interests and penal objectives.68 Unlike school children 9 and pre-
claim that the conditions to which they are subjected are violative of the [Eighth]
Amendment." Id. at 369; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). "The inquiry of
federal courts into prison management must be limited to the issue of whether a
particular system violates any prohibition of the Constitution . I..." Id. at 562; Cruz
v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam). "Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons
but to enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons' including prisoners." Id. at
321.
65. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).
66. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). Support for
this view can be found in the thirteenth amendment, which states, "Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1.
67. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). See generally I. SEN-
SENICH, COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW ON PRISONERS' RIGHTS (Federal Judicial Center
1979); 2 PRISONERs' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK: THEORY-LITIGATION-PRACTICE (I. Robbins
ed. 1980).
68. See, e.g., Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556 ("there must be mutual accomodation
between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that
are of general application"). Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) ("a prison
inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status
as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system");
United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1978), reh'g denied, 599 F.2d
619 (5th Cir. 1979) ("the court must balance the public interest in conducting the
search against [prisoner's] ... Fourth amendment interest"); LaReau v. Mac-
Dougall, 473 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973)
(prisoners were legitimately denied access to prison chapel because, "'to allow them
[access] would be to invite trouble").
69. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (eighth amendment does not apply
to disciplinary corporal punishment in public schools).
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trial detainees, 70 however, prisoners have been granted the protection
of the eighth amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments."
7
'
B. The Eighth Amendment
Although the eighth amendment originally was perceived as a ban
against whippings, floggings and other forms of excessive punish-
ment, 72 it is a dynamic provision that draws its meaning from "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. '73 The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is
not limited to specific acts directed at select individuals, but is equally
applicable to general prison conditions that are violative of these
"evolving standards of decency."
Some cases have used emotional language, holding prison condi-
tions unconstitutional if they prompt a " 'cry of horror' -74 or are
"foul, . . . inhuman and. . violative of basic concepts of decency. 75
It is inappropriate to apply these emotional appeals to the failure to
maintain adequate disease prevention measures. 76
Generally courts have considered two unemotional approaches in
analyzing the sufficiency of disease prevention measures in prisons.
They either apply a specific test to determine the adequacy of prison
medical care77 or use the totality approach.
70. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (pre-trial detainees are
granted protection of fifth or fourteenth amendment's due process clause but not
protection of eighth amendment). See Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir.
1981) (inquiry regarding pre-trial detainees is whether there was any punishment
rather than whether punishment was cruel and unusual).
71. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment states: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." The eighth amendment is applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667
(1962).
72. See BERKSON, supra note 14, at 55. For a history of the eighth amendment,
see Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted": The Original Mean-
ing, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
73. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
74. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 676 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting O'Neil v.
Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1891) (Field, J., dissenting)).
75. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967).
76. See Robbins, Federal Courts and State Prison Reform, in 2 PRISONERS' RIGHTS
SOURCEBOOK: THEORY-LITIGATION-PRACTICE 127 (I. Robbins ed. 1980) (mere moral
outrage does not provide prison officials with any basis for establishment of prison
policies and criteria of confinement) [hereinafter cited as Federal Courts].
77. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). "[D]eliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 104 (citation omitted).
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1. The Totality Approach
Courts utilizing the totality approach avoid deciding the constitu-
tionality of a single condition by determining whether the cumulative
effect of all prison conditions results in the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment. 78 Though there are some advantages to this
approach, 79 the totality cases that use traditional eighth amendment
tests fail to establish guidelines for particular conditions, thus offering
little prospective guidance to prison administrators or courts.8 0 How-
ever, the extensive court orders which are a by-product of the totality
approach8 1 offer some guidance.8 2
For example, in Laaman v. Helgemoe,8 3 the court found that the
"initial failure of the system to provide for discovery of latent and
incubating diseases and medical problems" 84 was one of many prob-
lems which rendered New Hampshire State Prison's conditions uncon-
stitutional in their totality. 85 The court succeeded, however, in fash-
ioning a precise remedy in spite of its initial broad focus on general
prison conditions. The court issued a mandatory injunction ordering
"[a] prompt medical examination and medical history by a physician
78. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (prison conditions "alone or in
combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessi-
ties"); accord Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1212 (5th Cir. 1977); Inmates of
Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 565 F. Supp. 1278, 1295 (W.D. Pa. 1983); French
v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910, 912 (S.D. Ind. 1982); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.
Supp. 269, 317 (D.N.H. 1977); Inmates D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 416 F. Supp. 119, 121
(D.D.C. 1976); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 893 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501
F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. Ark. 1970),
aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
The Ninth Circuit, however, specifically has rejected the totality approach.
Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981); Stickney v. List, 519 F.
Supp. 617, 619 (D. Nev. 1981).
79. See Prison Reform, supra note 14, at 368-69 (totality approach enables judges
to reform more basic problems of filth, overcrowding, inadequate diet and violence,
which if decided individually, would not rise to constitutional violation).
80. See Federal Courts, supra note 76, at 127.
81. For examples of extensive court orders, see cases cited in supra note 53.
82. See Complex Enforcement, supra note 10, at 638 (tendency in complex cases
is for "remedies to become part of the substantive law, as 'rights' in themselves or,
more generally, as the normative criteria by which a system's lawfulness is judged").
83. 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977).
84. Id. at 312. A formal policy existed at New Hampshire State Prison requiring
a new inmate to have a routine blood test within seventy-two hours of his arrival. In
reality, this procedure was a sham as only one inmate testified that he had seen the
doctor within the prescribed seventy-two hour period, while many never saw a
doctor at all. Id. at 283.
85. The court specifically found inadequate physical facilities, insufficient medi-
cal and mental health care and an overall dangerous environment. Id. at 322-25.
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upon commitment, . . . directed to the discovery of physical or men-
tal illness; [and] the segregation of prisoners suspected of infectious or
contagious conditions. ' 81
2. Medical Care under the Eighth Amendment
The alternative to the totality approach is the specific approach.
The test used to determine the constitutionality of a prison's medical
care under the specific approach was enunciated in Estelle v. Gam-
ble 7 and developed in subsequent cases. 88 It is the prevailing basis for
determining the adequacy of a prison's disease prevention measures.8"
The Supreme Court in Estelle held that deliberate 90 indifference to
serious medical needs91 of prisoners constitutes an unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the eighth amendment. 2 In
Lareau v. Manson,93 the Second Circuit quoted Estelle in holding that
failure to adequately screen newly arrived inmates for communicable
diseases was an omission " 'sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.' 94
The Estelle test subsequently was tailored to assist in the identifica-
tion of systemic institutional violations. Courts have held that the
eighth amendment is violated when "systematic deficiencies in staff-
ing, facilities or procedures make unnecessary suffering inevitable."95
86. Id. at 327.
87. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
88. For a discussion of this development, see infra note 95 and accompanying
text.
89. See Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying Estelle to
intake screening procedures); Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 1977)
(finding that Estelle does not mandate that all incoming prisoners be given medical
examination within 36 hours of incarceration in absence of reasonable grounds to
suspect that inmate requires examination to protect himself or others).
90. 429 U.S. at 105-06 (expressly warning that deliberate indifference and not
mere negligence or medical malpractice rises to an eighth amendment violation).
See, e.g., Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849
(1980); Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890-91 (Ist Cir. 1980); Parrilla v. Cuyler,
447 F. Supp. 363, 366 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
91. A "serious medical need" is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp.
269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977).
92. 429 U.S. at 104.
93. 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
94. Id. at 109.
95. See Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977); accord Inmates of
Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979); Cruz v. Ward,
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This test was used in Lightfoot v. Walker,96 where the court found
that the measures used to isolate prisoners with communicable dis-
eases and to conduct physical examinations upon admission were so
inadequate that suffering was inevitable. 7
The Estelle test and its progeny are well suited for determining the
adequacy of a prison's disease prevention procedure. These tests offer
more specific guidelines than the subjective" and moralistic99 eighth
amendment tests used in totality cases. Frivolous cases that allege
inadequate protection from colds and flu'00 will be dismissed as not
meeting Estelle's "serious illness" requirement.
A specific approach like Estelle's, assists federal courts in making
their threshold determination of whether a claim that a prison lacks
adequate disease prevention measures rises to the level of a constitu-
tional violation. If so, it is a proper subject matter for federal court
adjudication.
C. Constitutional Avoidance
In determining the need for disease preventive measures, many
cases have avoided confrontation with the federalism doctrine by
applying state statutes.' 0' These statutes are applied in accordance
558 F.2d 658, 661-62 (2d Cir. 1977); Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1328-30
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp.
1252, 1307 (S.D. W. Va. 1981).
96. 486 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Ill. 1980).
97. Id. at 512, 524. Because examinations systematically lacked blood and syphi-
lis tests and other ordinary preventive medical measures, it was feared that the entire
medical community would be endangered. Id. at 524.
98. See Holt, 309 F. Supp. at 373. There the court held that the eighth amend-
ment is violated when prison conditions shock the conscience. Id. Commentators
suggest that no objective standard can be drawn from this approach. See Prison
Reform, supra note 14, at 372; Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment:
An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 838 (1972). See
also Prison Reform, supra note 14, at 377 (describing eighth amendment as an
"inevitably subjective constitutional command").
99. See supra notes 74-72 and accompanying text.
100. Gibson v.McEvers, 631 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1980) (refusal of medical treatment
for cold was not basis for constitutional violation).
101. See,e.g., French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910, 924 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (applying
IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-3-2(c) (Burns 1981), which mandates medical screening at
intake); Nicholson v. Choctaw County, 498 F. Supp. 295, 312 (S.D. Ala. 1980)
(applying ALA. CODE § 14-6-60 (1975), which mandates removal of tubercular pris-
oners); Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 406 F. Supp. 649, 669 (S.D. Tex. 1975)
(applying TEx. Civ. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 5115 (1975), which mandates adequate
classification and segregation of prisoners with communicable diseases).
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with the principle that courts should avoid constitutional issues where
statutory claims are dispositive. 02 Analysis of the Penhurst decision,°103
however, questions the viability of the constitutional avoidance doc-
trine at least as it applies to claims against state officials.10 4
Because Penhurst prohibits federal courts from enforcing pendent
state claims against state officials, courts may be prompted to avoid
the state claim and base their decisions on federal constitutional
grounds. 05 As a result, state prison condition cases alleging inade-
quate disease prevention measures that are brought in federal court
increasingly will be decided on eighth amendment rather than pen-
dent state grounds. Ironically, the Penhurst majority, "guided by 'the
principles of federalism that inform [the] Eleventh Amendment,' "106
actually may have debased the federalism doctrine by forcing federal
courts to ignore state law and to make their decisions on federal
constitutional grounds. 10 7
Even before Penhurst, the constitutional avoidance doctrine was
not absolute and could be disregarded when necessary. 08 Justifica-
tions for reaching the constitutionality of prison conditions were enun-
ciated in Lightfoot v. Walker. 09 In Lightfoot, the federal court
decided that state disease prevention measures were inadequate 10
despite the existence of a dispositive state statute."'
102. This is in accord with general constitutional law. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528, 543 (1974); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) "[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a
constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will only decide the latter." Id. at 347; Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.
Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
103. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
104. Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 939-42 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for departing from constitu-
tional avoidance principle enunciated in Siler, 213 U.S. at 175).
105. Id. at 922 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "This new pronouncement will require
the federal courts to decide federal constitutional questions despite the availability of
state-law grounds for [its] decision. ... Id.
106. Id. at 908 (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978)).
107. Id. at 942 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[T]he rule the majority creates today
serves none of the interests of the State. The majority prevents federal courts from
implementing State policies through equitable enforcement of State law." Id.
108. Siler, 213 U.S. at 193. Where a case can be decided in federal courts without
reference to the Federal Constitution, then "that course is usually pursued and is not
departed from without important reasons." Id.
109. 486 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Ill. 1980).
110. Id. at 524 (court's conclusion was based upon eighth amendment standards of
Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977).
111. The court could have ruled on intake screening procedure pursuant to ILL.
REv. STAT. UNIFIED CORRECTIONS CODE ch. 38, § 1003-8-2(c) (Smith-Hurd 1982) (eff.
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The court determined the adequacy of the prison's conditions on
constitutional grounds because the relief was to be financed by state
resources. 12 Therefore, the court stated that "[a] decision predicated
solely on state law may give the state impetus to change that law...
[to] circumvent the [expense of] the relief. ' " 3 This rationale is sup-
ported by the fact that the relief in prison condition cases is prospec-
tive and awarded to "an unfavored disenfranchised class of per-
sons."1 1 4 In addition, the court reasoned that if the constitutional
question were avoided and the law later changed, the state would be
"without guidance as to the minimally acceptable standards necessary
to comply with the Constitution."' 5
The need for proper guidance concerning minimal constitutional
standards of disease prevention measures, evidenced by the varied and
conflicting approaches and responses to the problem, 6 can be cured
by enlightened federal court decisions. While federal courts retain the
power to determine minimum constitutional standards, however, the
remedies necessary to enforce those standards are often so comprehen-
sive' 17 that the judiciary is criticized for breaching the doctrine of
separation of powers.l11
IV. Separation of Powers
The Supreme Court has warned that the "problems of prisons in
America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are
Jan. 1, 1973), which states: "Upon admission to a correctional institution each
committed person shall be given a physical examination, and if he is suspected of
having a communicable disease, he shall be quarantined until he is known to be free
from such disease."
112. Lightfoot, 486 F. Supp. at 508 ("although individuals are nominally defend-
ants in this case, the relief must necessarily come from state sources").
113. Id. However, if the claim is based on an unalterable judicial decree, justifica-
tion for reaching constitutional questions disappears. Id., at 508-09.
114. Id. at 508. For a discussion of the political powerlessness of prisoners, see
infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
115. Lightfoot, 486 F. Supp. at 508.
116. For a discussion of the various judicial standards, see supra notes 77-100 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the varying legislation, see infra notes 119-24
and accompanying text.
117. See cases cited in supra note 76; Prison Reform, supra note 14, at 370;
Federal Intervention, supra note 21, at 936 (in totality cases federal courts have
implemented relief which required restructuring of prison's physical facility and
administrative policies).
118. See Padgett v. Stein, 406 F. Supp. 287, 304 (M.D. Pa. 1975) ("[p]rison
reform is a matter for the political branches of government, not for the courts");
Prison Reform, supra note 14, at 377 ("[s]eparation of powers concerns arise when a
court specifies the details of prison life, thus making decisions which might be better
made by popularly-elected officials") (footnote omitted).
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not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise,
comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of
which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government." 119 However, state legislative response
to the need for disease prevention measures has been inadequate. For
example, statutes prescribing physical examinations at intake often
are not mandatory,1 20 aimed at discovering only particular communi-
cable diseases,12 1 or completely silent on the issue of communicable
diseases.' 2 2 Other state statutes requiring prisoners to be removed
from prison after pestilence breaks out do not address the primary
goal of preventing communicable diseases.' 23 Even where legislative
policy apparently has satisfied eighth amendment requirements,' 2 4
state prison conditions remain unchanged because administrators' dis-
cretionary authority can shield prison conditions from close legislative
and public scrutiny. 125 The inadequate response of the legislative and
119. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974). The Court held that the
prison's mail censorship procedure was violative of the first amendment. Id. at 415-
16.
120. Six states have enacted statutes which permit, but do not mandate, medical
examinations of all inmates at intake. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a 103 (1983); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 3037 (Supp. 1983-1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18-108
(1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-100 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (venereal disease examina-
tions); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.030 (1975) (mandatory examination is only
for inmates reasonably suspected of venereal disease); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 46.13 (West
1979) (Wassermann test for syphilis).
121. See ALA. CODE § 14-3-41 (1982) (tuberculosis); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-405
(1982) (venereal disease); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 705 (1983) (venereal disease);
IDAHO CODE § 39-604 (1979) (venereal disease); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-225(a)(3)
(1983) (tuberculosis and venereal disease); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07-08 (1978)
(venereal disease); OR. REv. STAT. § 434.170 (1981) (venereal disease); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 26-6-19 (Supp. 1983) (venereal disease).
122. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.267 (West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-19(c)
(1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 1 (Purdon 1964).
123. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4012 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-635
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 20-609 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5224 (1977); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 3071(2) (West Supp. 1983-1984); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 126,
§ 26 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.57 (West 1972 & Supp.
1983-1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-3-7 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-2-29 (1978);
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 141 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 475 (West 1973); VA. CODE § 53.1-133 (1982) (local facility); Id. § 53.1-34 (State
facility); Wyo. STAT. § 35-4-134 (1977) (removal for venereal disease).
124. For statutes mandating physical examinations of inmates at intake to detect
communicable disease, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-2(c) (Smith-Hurd 1982);
IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-3-2 (Burns 1981); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 16 (Michie/
Law Co-op. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-179 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 530
(West Supp. 1983-1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 801(b)(Supp. 1983-1984).
125. See French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910, 917-18 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (despite
statute prescribing medical examinations for inmates (IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-3-2
(Burns 1981)) communicable tuberculosis went undetected for months).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XII
and executive branches of government may justify judicial interven-
tion.
Prisoners lack political power and therefore have difficulty achiev-
ing redress through normal democratic processes. 26 Thus, the judici-
ary is forced to balance the interests of the majority against the rights
of a politically weak minority. 127 The political powerlessness of pris-
oners is exacerbated by the lack of outside intervention by politically
stronger community members12 8 who are discouraged by security con-
siderations and the physical and emotional invisibility of prisons. 129
Fiscal restraints also may have prevented legislatures from acting
more responsively. 130 Prison administration expenses have increased as
the prison population has risen. 13 1 Judicial intervention, however,
forces states to allocate resources to rectify state prison conditions, 32
126. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 358 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(political powerlessness of inmates has contributed to pervasive neglect of prisons).
Accord Federal Activism, supra note 24, at 1365.
127. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Chief Justice
Stone questioned "whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 153 n.4.
128. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 358 (Brennan J., concurring) (public apathy contributes
to prison neglect). Prior to the famous Holt litigation, the people of Arkansas" 'knew
little or nothing about their penal system.' " Id. (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp.
362, 367 (E.D. Ark. 1970)). Outside community intervention is further limited by the
political weakness of the inmates' family and friends. See Prison Reform, supra note
14, at 386 (prisoners come from socio-economic groups which lack political power).
129. "Both as cause and effect of this invisibility, the community ordinarily has as
little interest in the people it sends to prison as most of us have in our garbage-we
want it disposed of safely, quickly, and without much mess, but we don't particularly
care how." Bronstein, Offender Rights Litigation: Historical Future Developments in
2 PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK: THEORY-LITIGATION-PRACTICE 7 (1. Robbins ed.
1980).
130. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring) (prison funding often
has been dramatically below what is required to comply with basic constitutional
standards). For example, to comply with constitutional standards the Louisiana
prison system "required a supplemental appropriation of $18,431,622 for a single
year's operating expenditures, and of $105,605,000 for capital outlays." Id. (citing
Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1219-21 (5th Cir. 1977) (Exhibit A)).
131. The Justice Department reported an increase of 11.5% or 43,797 inmates in
federal and state prisons between 1982 and 1983. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug.
22, 1983, at 11, col. 4. Between 1975 and 1981 the number of inmates in federal and
state correctional facilities rose 42%. Krajick, The Boom Resumes, 7 CORRECTIONS
MAG., 16-20 (Apr. 1981) (report of annual survey of prison population). Causes for
the rise in population are stiffer sentencing, increased crime rates, and more restric-
tive parole practices. Id. at 17.
132. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring) "Insulated as they are
from political pressures, and charged with the duty of enforcing the Constitution,
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because "costs cannot be permitted to stand in the way of eliminating
[prison] conditions below Eighth Amendment standards."'133
One commentator observed that "[j]udges have not entered this
domain by usurping a roving commission to cure the manifold evils of
our nation's prisons," but they have "performed the ordinary judicial
function of granting redress for 'specific legal injury.' "134 However, in
light of the extensive and complex remedies in institutional reform
litigation, 135 the judiciary may lack the requisite expertise necessary to
formulate such redress, while the legislature does not. 136 In response to
this criticism, courts have enlisted the help of outside masters 37 with
the expertise necessary to oversee the extensive remedies used in prison
condition cases. 138
courts are in the strongest position to insist that unconstitutional conditions be
remedied, even at significant financial costs." Id.
133. Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 1981); see Finney v.
Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 501
F.2d 1291, 1320 (5th Cir. 1974).
134. Kaufman, Foreword to 2 PRISONERs' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK: THEORY-LITIGA-
TION-PRACTICE (I. Robbins ed. 1980). According to Judge Kaufman, "[w]hen we
grant relief to a party-even the most far-reaching and detailed injunctive relief-we
do so because we are compelled to." Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88
YALE L.J. 681, 689 (1979)
135. See supra notes 78 & 117 and accompanying text. See also Nathan, The Use
of Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation, 10. TOL. L. REV. 419, 419 (1979)(vin-
dicating fundamental constitutional rights in prison setting requires remedy which is
often "complex and generally requires an extended period of time for effectuation")
[hereinafter cited as Use of Masters].
136. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
137. "Master" is defined as "any person or persons appointed by a court to assist it
in determining liability or the scope of remedial relief as well as in the monitoring or
implementation of a remedial decree." Use of Masters, supra note 135, at 420. The
term "master" includes many denominations. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d
1291, 1321 (5th Cir. 1974) ("monitor") Taylor v. Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189, 193 (N.D.
Ohio 1976) ("Special Master"); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 331-32 (M.D. Ala.
1976), aff'd in part, modified in part sub nom., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978) ("Human Rights Committee");
Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 841 (M.D. Fla. 1975), affd in part, modified in
part and remanded, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Ombudsman"). For other de-
nominations, see Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform
Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 826 (1978).
Courts originally based their authority to appoint masters upon their inherent
power "to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the per-
formance of their duties." Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1920). Now their
authority is based on the express provisions of Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which states: "The court in which any action is pending may appoint a
special master therein." FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a).
138. See, e.g., Gates, 501 F.2d at 1321; Lightfoot v. Walker, 486 F. Supp. 504,
528-29 (S.D. Ill. 1980); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 989 (D.R.I. 1977),
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District courts' use of masters can have incidental benefits, such as
establishing a new standard for prison social structure and condi-
tions' 19 and exposing "prison officials to more effective methods of
administration."'40 A master's primary function, however, is provid-
ing a coercive constituency for inmates so that resources and energy
are devoted to improving prison conditions.' 4 '
Masters can be used more effectively in the disease prevention
setting than in totality cases. For example, contempt for judicial
intervention in prison affairs 142 may prompt prison officials to attempt
to frustrate the master's effectiveness. ' 41 In totality cases, such an
attempt at frustration may be successful because of the master's inabil-
ity to oversee and execute the comprehensive remedy. 144 In the less
complicated disease prevention setting, however, a master's task of
administering remedies is easier, since medical examinations and in-
take screenings are performed by a small number of people who can
be supervised more easily. 145 In addition, choosing a master with the
myriad skills necessary to administer remedies in totality cases is
difficult.146 Choosing a master to oversee disease prevention measures
is easier, given the specific medical expertise needed. 147
aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Pugh, 406 F. Supp.
at 331-32; Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549, 555 (E.D. La. 1972); Note,
"Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L. J. 1062, 1063 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Mastering Prisons].
139. Mastering Prisons, supra note 138, at 1067-68.
140. Id. at 1068. Prison administrators often are unaware of alternative methods
of operation. Id. at 1067.
141. Id. at 1073.
142. Id. at 1074 (prison administrators "are not committed to judicial intervention
as a way of addressing prison problems"). Officers and guards resent judicial inter-
vention in prisons because they feel that courts favor inmates. Prison administrators-
also resent being "second-guessed" by the courts. J. JACOBS. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 56 (1983).
143. See Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 671 (D.R.I. 1978), enforcing
443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977) (prison officials held in civil contempt for failure to
implement court order because of reasons unrelated to their ability to comply);
Mastering Prisons, supra note 138, at 1075-78 (prison administrators may try to
control information available to master).
144. Mastering Prisons, supra note 138, at 1081 (master "lacks the power to
modify the prison's internal delegation of responsibility" for executing solutions to
problem).
145. See French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910, 927 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (court ordering
medical staff at prison housing over 1500 inmates to include two full-time medical
doctors, five full-time physician assistants and nine medical technicians).
146. See Use of Masters, supra note 135, at 448 (multi-issue cases require general
administrative skills).




The danger caused by the high incidence of disease permeating our
nation's prisons148 has prompted correctional organizations and public
health professionals to design model disease prevention standards. 49
Yet courts have been reluctant to use these model standards in their
eighth amendment analysis of prison conditions'50 because "they sim-
ply do not establish the constitutional minima .... ."151 Rather, courts
have relied on "the public attitude toward a given sanction.'1 52 How-
ever, public antipathy, 53 political aberrations regarding convicted
inmates, 154 and subjective eighth amendment standards155 present a
strong prima facie case for the use of nonpolitical model standards to
guide courts and legislatures in establishing eighth amendment
norms. 156
Consequently, courts should realize that model standards, rather
than "public attitudes," will control the spread of disease in our
nation's prisons. The following procedures, suggested by a variety of
organizations, are intended to reduce inmates' chances of being ex-
posed to communicable disease.
A. Intake Screening
A pre-trial detainee or convicted inmate should have a complete
medical examination 157 by a qualified physician' 58 before admittance
148. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 157-73 and accompanying text.
150. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 n. 13 (1981)(assumption that "opinions of experts as
to desirable prison conditions suffice to establish contemporary standards of decency"
found erroneous).
151. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544 n.27 (1979)
152. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)(Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
153. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
156. See Federal Activism, supra note 24, at 1365.
157. See STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS Standard 2-4289
(American Corrections Ass'n 2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as A.C.A. STANDARDS];
UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS, supra note 3, Standard 24; CRIMINAL STANDARDS AND
GOALS § 2.5 (National Advisory Comm'n 1973); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE LEGAL
STATUS OF PRISONERS § 23-5.3 (Tent. Draft 1979) as appears in Axilbund, The (Non-)
Standards Relating to the Legal Status of Prisoners app. in 2 PRISONERS RIGHTS
SOURCEBOOK: THEORY-LITIGATION-PRACTICE 441 (I. Robbins ed. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as: A.B.A. DRAFr]. Accord, Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 111 (2nd Cir.
1981); Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1307 (S.D. W. Va. 1981) (prompt
medical screening of inmates is "medical necessity"); Lightfoot, 486 F. Supp. at 526;
O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, 437 F. Supp. 582, 598 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
158. The term "qualified physician" should be interpretated carefully because
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into the general prison population. 59 The examination should in-
clude: (1) history of exposure to infectious agents and details about the
patient's lifestyle necessary to indicate infectious problems, 160 and (2)
systematic rather than selective' utilization of biological,6 2 chemi-
cal, 63 and physical 16 4 diagnostic16 5 tests to detect communicable dis-
eases. 166
B. Record Keeping
A uniform 16 7 system of medical records, including the inmate's
history of communicable diseases, should be kept.16 8
"many physicians in prison health programs are unlicensed foreigners or, for various
reasons, unable to obtain employment outside the prison system." Neisser, Is There a
Doctor in the Joint? The Search for Constitutional Standards for Prison Health Care,
63 VA. L. REV. 921, 937 (1977). Even capable physicians, finding the pay inade-
quate, may undertake a private practice which detracts him from his responsibilities
at the prison. Id. See also Morris, Minimum Standards for Medical Services in Prisons
and Jails, in MEDICAL CARE OF PISONERS AND DETAINEES 40 (Ciba Foundation
Symposium 1973) ("[r]ealistically, with a few sharp exceptions, the best-trained
doctors and the most qualified supportive professional staff are not to be found in the
service of prison and jails") (emphasis in original).
159. See O'Bryan, 437 F. Supp. at 598 (physical must be given prior to admitting
newly arrived inmates into general prison population in order to protect all inmates).
This requirement avoids arbitrary time limits. Compare Lareau, 651 F.2d at 111
(examination required to take place within 48 hours of inmate's arrival) with Light-
foot, 486 F. Supp. at 526 (examination required within seven days of inmate's
arrival).
160. See HEALTH PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 25, 28 (medical history is most
important component of intake screening); A.C.A. STANDARDS, supra note 157,
Standard 2-4292. For an example of a jail health screening form, see Nicholson v.
Choctaw County, 498 F. Supp. 295, 315 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (Exhibit I).
161. HEALTH RISKS, supra note 4, at 178.
162. For example, blood, urine, leukocyte counts, sputum and urogenital tract
specimens should be taken. See HEALTH PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 143-44.
163. See HEALTH RISKS, supra note 4, at 178 (Wassermann test for syphilis).
164. Id. (x-rays).
165. Id.
166. Id. The examination should serve other purposes such as detection of health,
psychiatric, dental, alcohol and drug problems. See A.C.A. STANDARDS, supra note
157, Standard 2-4289. Additionally, an immediate physical examination of incoming
inmates limits prison administrators' potential liability for a specific illness. SeeHEALTH RISKS, supra note 4, at 178.
167. Uniformity of medical records is easily achieved through the use of the
International Classification of Diseases. HEALTH RISKS, supra note 4, at 180-81.
Unfortunately, research and solutions for the problems of the spread of communica-
ble diseases in prisons have been hampered by the lack of data. See, HEALTH PROB-
LEMS, supra note 6, at 15-16 (information describing prevalence of venereal disease
and tuberculosis in correctional facilities is unavailable).
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C. Education
A program designed to educate the prison population about basic
health education and specific disease prevention measures should be
conducted.16 9
D. Periodic Exams
Routine periodic physical examinations should be made to identify
and isolate communicable disease. 170
E. Hygiene
Each inmate should be provided with sufficient bathing facilities' 17
and clean clothing 72 to enable him to maintain reasonable personal
hygiene and cleanliness. The institution should maintain pest control
through routine extermination procedures. 73
VI. Conclusion
Because of aberrations of the political process surrounding con-
victed inmates, legislation prescribing disease prevention measures
168. See A.C.A. STANDARDS, supra note 157, Standards 2-4319 to -4320; A.B.A.
DRAFr, supra note 157, Standard 23-5.4. Courts have recognized the need for medi-
cal records. See Dawson, 527 F. Supp. at 1306-07 (inadequate medical records give
rise to " 'possibility for disaster' ") (quoting Burks v. Teasdale, 492 F. Supp. 650, 676
(W.D. Mo. 1980)).
169. See A.C.A. STANDARDS, supra note 157, Standard 2-4303 (education about
venereal disease and tuberculosis encouraged). Education about AIDS specifically is
encouraged because of inmates' anxiety and the hysteria that surrounds the syn-
drome. See LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 707, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 310
(Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1983). See generally Moring & Batchelor, Responding to
the Psychological Crisis of AIDS, 99 PUBLIC HEALTH REP. 4 (Jan.-Feb. 1984); Her-
man, A Disease's Spread Provokes Anxiety, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1982, at 18, col. 1.
Prisoners' awareness that AIDS is transmitted through intravenous drug injections
and homosexual activity might discourage that activity. See LaRocca, 120 Misc. 2d
at 707, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 310; Maffucci, Responding to AIDS in Prisons: The Team
Approach, 45 CORRECTIONs TODAY 68, 82 (Dec. 1983).
170. See A.C.A. STANDARDS, supra note 157, Standard 2-4302 (persons under 50
years of age should receive examinations bienially, anyone older should receive them
annually); A.B.A. DRAFr, supra note 157, Standard 23-5.4(b)(ii).
171. See A.C.A. STANDARDS, supra note 157, Standards 2-4268 to -4269; A.B.A.
DRAyr, supra note 157, Standard 23-6.14(c)(iv). Sanitary facilities used by inmates
with infectious tuberculosis or hepatitis have been ordered segregated from general
prison population use. Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1331 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (197k).
172. See A.C.A. STANDARDS, supra note 157, Standards 2-4260 to -4261; A.B.A.
DRAFr,; supra note 157, Standard 23-6.14(c)(vii).
173. See A.C.A. STANDARDS, supra note 157, Standard 2-4258.
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either has been inadequate or ignored by prison administrators. Con-
sequently, exposure to dangerous diseases compels state prison inmates
to seek redress in federal courts through section 1983 actions. In the
past, concerns over notions of federalism and separation of powers
completely proscribed federal judicial intervention in state prison af-
fairs. Presently, federal courts will adjudicate a prisoner's constitu-
tional rights.
A prisoner's right to adequate disease prevention measures is de-
rived from the Constitution's eighth amendment; therefore, federal
judicial intervention is permitted. Such intervention can be made
more effective if masters and model standards are employed.
Anthony L. Paccione
